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YOU DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN DRUNK: 
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF IMPLIED CONSENT THROUGH 
FIFTH AMENDMENT VOLUNTARINESS STANDARDS 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
 KINGS COUNTY 
People v. Perez1 
(decided August 2, 2012) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The prosecution charged the defendant, Hector Perez, with 
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.2  On June 5, 
2012, the Supreme Court of Kings County held a combined 
Mapp/Huntley hearing to decide the admissibility of seized evidence 
and statements made to the police by the defendant on the night of his 
arrest.3  The defendant was arrested at the home of his girlfriend, Elsa 
Diaz, on February 5, 2011, after an altercation involving her grand-
son, Cesar Pabon.4  Officers were called to the building and then 
sought Ms. Diaz’s consent to search her apartment.5  Consent was 
granted, but the defendant challenged the prosecution’s use of her 
consent.6  The defendant argued that Ms. Diaz’s consent was not giv-
en with the requisite degree of voluntariness, for a number of reasons, 
including her level of intoxication.7 
Voluntary consent to search can only be given as “a true act 
of the will, an unequivocal product of an essentially free and uncon-
 
1 951 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
2 Id. at 338. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 340. 
5 Id. at 339. 
6 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 339, 341. 
7 Id. at 343. 
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strained choice.”8  Both the United States Supreme Court and the 
New York Court of Appeals have determined that voluntarily grant-
ing officers consent to search is a valid exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.9  Consent searches are one of the 
most useful tools in law enforcement’s repertoire.10  Obtaining con-
sent can help an officer seize evidence that could be destroyed in the 
time it would take to obtain a warrant.11  Because of the value and 
broad possibility of intrusion on personal liberty associated with this 
type of search, prosecutors bear a heavy burden in establishing that 
consent to search was voluntarily given.12 
The voluntariness of an individual’s grant of consent can be 
challenged in a variety of ways as was done in Perez.13  This Note fo-
cuses on one aspect, the effects of intoxication on an individual’s 
ability to freely consent to a search.14  As this Note demonstrates, the 
prosecution must satisfy what is in reality an extremely deferential 
standard when showing that an individual is too intoxicated to under-
stand his or her choice to consent.  Establishing that an individual is 
overly intoxicated negates the voluntariness of his consent to the 
search,15 however, in New York, proving that an individual is too im-
paired to consent is exceedingly difficult.16  This standard, which 
weakens the effect of subjective intoxication on the validity of con-
sent, is useful, providing an excellent model for analyzing a different 
type of consent search—the implied consent statute created in con-
 
8 People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580 (N.Y. 1976). 
9 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is well settled under the 
Fourth Amendment that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is 
‘per se unreasonable . . . .’  It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established 
exceptions . . . is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); see Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580 
(incorporating the Schneckloth totality of the circumstances test into New York Law). 
10 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (reasoning that frequently officers will suspect illicit ac-
tivity, but not have the required probable cause, and in those circumstances a valid consent 
search will be the only means of obtaining the evidence). 
11 Id. 
12 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (holding that the State bears the burden of 
establishing an exceptional situation to justify a warrantless search). 
13 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 341, 343-44, 346 (compiling and assessing defendant’s multiple 
challenges to the voluntariness of consent). 
14 See infra Parts III-V (discussing the effect of intoxication or mental impairment on the 
validity of voluntary consent to search). 
15 See infra Part III (discussing the Schompert mania test for determining whether intoxi-
cation affects the voluntariness of a grant of consent). 
16 Id. 
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junction with New York’s driving under the influence law.17 
Because of the expansive use and high value of consent 
searches, the New York legislature was the first in the country to cre-
ate an implied consent statute for drivers within the state.18  Drivers 
in all fifty states, as a condition of accepting a license, consent to a 
search of their body for the presence of drugs or alcohol in connec-
tion with an arrest for driving under the influence.19  However, in 
New York, this consent is qualified by a statutorily created right to 
revoke this implied consent and refuse the test.20  Legislation has re-
cently been proposed to weaken the right to refuse21 in an effort to 
deter driving under the influence22 and help combat one of the most 
dangerous activities affecting our society.23  The standards discussed 
in the traditional consent search context suggest that the time has 
come for approval of this legislation,24 reflecting important and need-
ed changes,25 strengthening the validity of implied consent and weak-
ening the right to refuse a search. 
II. THE OPINION: PEOPLE V. PEREZ 
On the evening of February 5, 2011, the defendant, Hector 
 
17 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney 2013) (granting the State implied 
consent to search any individual over the age of twenty-one who operates a motor vehicle, 
for the presence of drugs or alcohol, if arrested for driving under the influence) [hereinafter 
VTL]. 
18 Penn Lerblance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 39 n.2 (1978). 
19 Id. at 39; 2011 S.B 3768 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (highlighting that nine states have a 
stronger version of an implied consent law). 
20 See VTL § 1194(2)-(3) (creating, penalizing, and limiting a statutorily created right to 
refuse the chemical test, and revoke implied consent). 
21 2011 S.B 3768 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (proposing an elimination of the right to refuse 
in New York whenever an officer has probable cause to suspect an individual of driving un-
der the influence). 
22 Id. (suggesting this legislation would “add real teeth to the implied consent provision” 
in VTL § 1194). 
23 See Drunk Driving Facts, MADD, http://www.MADD.org/drunk-driving/ (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2012) (stating that 350,000 people a year are killed or seriously injured by drunk 
driving). 
24 See infra Parts III-VII. 
25 Maine received the top score in the nation as just twenty-three people died in DUI relat-
ed deaths, in part because of the state’s partial denial of the right to refuse.  MADD–Maine, 
MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/state-stats/Maine.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2013). 
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Perez, was staying at the home of his girlfriend, Elsa Diaz.26  Ms. Di-
az lived in the same apartment building as Emerson and Hernan Her-
nandez, two friends of her grandson, Cesar Pabon.27  While Mr. 
Pabon was visiting the Hernandez brothers, he went downstairs to 
speak with his grandmother, Ms. Diaz.28  During Mr. Pabon’s con-
versation with Ms. Diaz, the defendant came out of the apartment and 
began to argue with her.29  The defendant then momentarily left the 
argument, re-entered the apartment, and returned allegedly brandish-
ing a handgun.30  Mr. Pabon, who witnessed the incident, testified at 
the hearing that both Ms. Diaz and the defendant were intoxicated 
during this altercation.31 
The police, who were called because of the incident, arrived 
about fifteen minutes later.32  During that time, Mr. Pabon and the 
Hernandez brothers physically assaulted and locked the defendant in 
the basement.33  The police searched the basement of the apartment 
building after breaking up the fight, but found nothing.34  After the 
fruitless search, police officer Gabriel Cuevas noticed Ms. Diaz who 
was “shaking and mumbling.”35  The officer offered Ms. Diaz assis-
tance, which she refused, and then began to question her about the 
presence of any guns in the apartment.36  Ms. Diaz admitted that the 
defendant lived in her apartment, but refused to say anything about a 
gun.37  Officer Cuevas then requested permission to search the apart-
ment, and Ms. Diaz responded by claiming that “she was not aware 
of any gun in the apartment.”38 
Ms. Diaz then reluctantly agreed to let officers conduct the 
search.39  Officer Cuevas retrieved a consent-to-search form from his 
patrol car, which Ms. Diaz signed.40  Once inside the apartment, Of-
 
26 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 339. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 339. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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ficer Cuevas began to search the bedroom.41  When searching a filing 
cabinet within the bedroom, Officer Cuevas discovered an unloaded 
revolver and a box of fifty rounds of ammunition, and he then called 
for backup.42  Ms. Diaz noticed this, began screaming uncontrollably, 
and had to be detained by the officers.43  Mr. Pabon subsequently 
identified the weapon as the one the defendant threatened him with.44  
The defendant was arrested and later indicted for criminal possession 
of a weapon.45 
The court in Perez began by laying out the procedural re-
quirements for a challenge to a search, stating the hallmark of search 
challenges: that any warrantless search of a home conducted without 
a warrant is per se unreasonable.46  In the instant case, no warrant 
was sought.47  When no warrant is sought, but there is ample time to 
obtain one the prosecution bears a heavy burden in establishing the 
search was conducted reasonably.48  As stated above, voluntarily 
granting consent to search is an exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s typical requirement of a warrant and probable cause.49  There-
fore, if Ms. Diaz’s consent to search was given voluntarily, the search 
would be reasonable and constitutional as long as officers did not ex-
ceed the scope of that consent.50 
Before assessing the intoxication challenge to the consent 
search, the court in Perez first dealt with the threshold issue of per-
 
41 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 339. 
42 Id. at 339-40. 
43 Id. at 340. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219). 
47 Id. at 342. 
48 Id. at 340 (citing People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531, 535 (N.Y. 1981)). 
49 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 (defining the voluntary consent exception to the war-
rant requirement). 
50 See id. (establishing that once voluntary consent has been established the search has 
been conducted validly).  The search, however, must remain within the scope of the consent 
given.  See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (setting up an objective reasonableness 
test for determining whether an officer’s search exceeded the scope of the voluntary con-
sent).  Coercion, when present, invalidates the consent, and consequently the search.  Bump-
er v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).  Coercion means that an individual acqui-
esced to authority, and did not possess the requisite free and unconstrained state of mind 
needed for voluntariness.  Id. at 548-50.  For an overview of the elements, concerns, and 
practical considerations assessed in determining whether voluntary consent was established, 
in New York and Federal law see Daniel Fier, Note, It’s In The Bag: Voluntariness, Scope, 
and the Authority to Grant Consent, 28 TOURO L. REV. 687 (2012). 
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sonal standing.51  The court also assessed the defendant’s other chal-
lenges, namely that Ms. Diaz did not have the authority to grant con-
sent and that her consent was not given voluntarily.52  While the court 
in Perez decided that the defendant passed the threshold test,53 it ul-
timately concluded that although Ms. Diaz had the authority to con-
sent to the search,54 she did not do so voluntarily,55 and therefore or-
dered the suppression of the seizures of the gun and the 
ammunition.56 
One of the defendant’s challenges to the validity of Ms. Di-
 
51 Personal standing is defined as a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises 
searched, or the thing seized, and is required before a search can be challenged.  Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 128 (1978). 
52 The defendant argued that Ms. Diaz did not have the requisite authority to grant consent 
to search because he was a co-occupant of the residence, and that Ms. Diaz did not consent 
to the search of the premises voluntarily.  Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 342, 344, 345. 
53 The test of personal standing has an objective and subjective component, which exam-
ine whether the defendant took steps to preserve the property, and whether society is willing 
to accept his or her connection to the property as reasonable.  People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 
666 N.E.2d 207, 212 (N.Y. 1996).  The defendant stayed in Ms. Diaz’s home most weekend 
nights and left clothing there to be washed.  Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 342.  Additionally, Ms. 
Diaz identified part of the bedroom as the defendant’s side, and the defendant was held to 
have established the required expectation of privacy to meet the test of personal standing.  
Id. 
54 An individual must have the requisite degree of control over the premises to grant con-
sent.  People v. Cosme, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1979).  Although consent cannot be 
given over the objection of a co-occupant when he or she is present, if one co-tenant is not 
present, or does not object, the other co-occupant’s grant of consent is valid, and officers 
may conduct the search.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006).  The defendant 
was not present and therefore, Ms. Diaz had the requisite authority to grant permission for a 
search of the apartment and the filing cabinet in the bedroom.  Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 344-
45. 
55 By definition, consent must be given voluntarily, and is incompatible with official coer-
cion of any kind.  Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580.  The court in Gonzalez identified five fac-
tors, viewed in the totality of the circumstances with no one factor being determinative, that 
are assessed to determine whether coercion invalidates a grant of consent to search: 
[W]hether the consenter was in custody at the time she gave her consent; 
whether the consenter acted evasively in her encounter with the police; 
any threats or coercive techniques employed by the police prior to the 
obtaining of consent; whether the officers advised the consenter that she 
has the right to refuse to consent to the requested search; and the number 
of law enforcement personnel present when consent to search was grant-
ed. 
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (citing Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575) (citations omitted).  Applying 
this test, the court in Perez found several of these factors weighed in favor of the defendant, 
particularly the fifth factor, as a total of fourteen officers were present at the time Ms. Diaz 
consented to the search, and her consent was therefore involuntary, and constituted a mere 
submission to lawful authority.  Id. at 345-46. 
56 Id. at 346. 
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az’s consent concerned her mental state at the time she gave con-
sent.57  Defendant argued that Ms. Diaz was too intoxicated to have 
the requisite state of mind to grant police a valid consent to search.58  
The court in Perez rejected this argument and set out the high stand-
ard that must be met for an individual’s intoxication or impairment to 
invalidate his or her consent to search.59  A defendant must prove that 
the individual who granted consent was so intoxicated that he or she 
reached the level of mania, or an inability to remain in touch with the 
reality of the situation.60  Although Ms. Diaz had to be restrained by 
officers, admitted to having multiple drinks that evening, and ap-
peared as if she were shaking and mumbling, the court held her intox-
ication did not meet the requisite level.61  What is important, howev-
er, is not the specific result, but rather the analysis used by the court 
in Perez, which was the same analysis used by the United States Su-
preme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.62 
III. THE SCHNECKLOTH DEFINITION OF “VOLUNTARY”: THE 
INCORPORATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT CONFESSION 
STANDARDS 
In Schneckloth, the Court was faced the difficult task of defin-
ing the word “voluntary,” specifically what “the prosecutor [must] 
prove to demonstrate that a consent was ‘voluntarily’ given.”63  The 
Court began by examining what it considered to be the most exten-
sive judicial attempt to define this elusive phrase—the standards ap-
plied in determining the voluntariness of a confession under the pro-
tections of the Fifth Amendment.64 
While the Fifth Amendment voluntariness cases did not pro-
vide a talismanic definition of the word, several relevant concerns 
 
57 Id. at 343. 
58 Id. 
59 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (“The requirement of ‘mania’ is . . . reflected in the level of 
intoxication required to negate an individual’s consent to search[;] . . . consent . . . is admis-
sible when [the individual is] sufficiently sober to have understood his rights and to have 
acted voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”); Id. at 343 (holding there was no evidence 
Ms. Diaz met this standard despite her aberrant behavior, and visible intoxication). 
60 Id.  See infra Part IV for a discussion of the mania standard in New York law. 
61 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 339, 340. 
62 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
63 Id. at 223. 
64 Id. at 223-24. 
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were identified and fleshed out.65  The main concern was the effect of 
subjective knowledge on the choice to voluntarily consent to a 
search,66 an important consideration because in this context, the item 
sought to be proven is literally an individual’s subjective 
knowledge.67  Two protective safeguards have developed for situa-
tions when a court is attempting to define an individual’s subjective 
voluntariness.  These safeguards are the knowing choice require-
ment68 and the formal waiver requirement.69  However, the Court 
held these protections were unnecessary in the consent search con-
text.70 
The Court reasoned that although it was adopting elements of 
the Fifth Amendment test for the voluntariness of a confession, it was 
excluding the more protective requirements because of specific con-
siderations supporting the Fourth Amendment.71  These considera-
tions, such as encouraging free communication with law enforce-
ment, informed the Court’s ultimate holding that voluntariness would 
be analyzed by the same basic test as the confession context.  The test 
requires that in order to find a voluntary grant of consent, the totality 
of the circumstances, specifically, whether the statement was made 
freely and with an unconstrained mind, should be examined.72  How-
ever, the more protective safeguards were found to be unnecessary in 
 
65 Id. at 224 (rejecting a literal definition of a voluntary choice as a knowing choice, as 
even a choice made under torture literally represents a choice between two definite possibili-
ties, and rejecting a “but for” test asking whether the statement would have been made ab-
sent official action, as under that test no statement could ever be considered voluntary). 
66 Id. at 224-25 (reasoning that looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine 
subjective voluntariness reflects an important set of values, that include both the police need 
to question citizens to determine the truth, and the individual interest in preventing the crim-
inal law from becoming an instrument of unfairness). 
67 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230. 
68 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (requiring that before a defendant’s 
statements be used against him, he must be informed of his right to remain silent, so that his 
subsequent choice to speak despite this becomes a knowing and voluntary one). 
69 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 488 (1981) (requiring that for certain pre-
trial protections, such as the right to assistance of counsel, a defendant must do more than 
make a knowing choice; there must be a formal waiver, “[a]n intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege”). 
70 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49. 
71 Id. at 234, 245 (reasoning that voluntariness is possible without a formal waiver or 
knowledge, and that other formal requirements could frustrate otherwise reasonable police 
activity, and rejecting these protections in favor of the Fourth Amendment’s ultimate goal, 
merely securing individuals from unreasonable intrusions). 
72 Id. at 248-49. 
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this field.73  Therefore, what is important about Schneckloth is not 
what it added to the test of consent, but what it excluded.74 
The Court first explained why the knowing choice require-
ment was unnecessary in the consent search context.  This require-
ment was articulated in the context of the Fifth Amendment’s protec-
tions over confessions and requires that an individual be informed of 
his or right to refuse to make a particular statement.75  However, the 
Court rejected applying this requirement to the consent to search con-
text for several reasons, reflecting both practical and policy based 
considerations.76 
In the context of a confession, the Fifth Amendment’s protec-
tions are necessary because the statement is made in a custodial situa-
tion which can significantly affect the individual’s rights.77  The priv-
ilege against self-incrimination requires that an individual have 
knowledge of their right to refuse to confess, and officers suffer the 
risk that, if the right to refuse is not effectively communicated, they 
may lose the use of that confession.78  However, injecting the know-
ing choice requirement into the consent search would hamper im-
portant functions protected by the Fourth Amendment;79 namely, the 
individual’s ability to freely communicate with law enforcement to 
help apprehend criminals,80 and law enforcement’s ability to courte-
ously, and without any assertion of authority, ask individuals ques-
tions that aid in investigations.81  This distinction was further sup-
ported in the Court’s opinion, by the non-custodial locations in which 
consent to search is typically requested, such as a car, home, or of-
fice.82  In fact, a key case on voluntary confessions, Miranda v. Ari-
 
73 Id. at 234, 245. 
74 Id.  
75 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
76 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231. 
77 Id. at 232; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 (“The very fact of [a] custodial interrogation ex-
acts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”). 
78 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
79 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 284-85. 
80 Id. at 243 (“ ‘It is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of 
criminals . . . . ’  Rather, the community has a strong interest in encouraging consent, for the 
resulting search may yield necessary evidence . . . that may insure that a wholly innocent 
person is not wrongly charged.” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 
(1971))). 
81 Id. at 230-31. 
82 Id. at 231-32. 
9
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zona,83 expressly made this distinction, excluding “general on-the-
scene questioning” from its protective holding.84 
The distinction between confessions and consent searches is 
also supported by practical considerations, specifically, situations in 
which two different statements take place.85  When an individual is 
making a confession in a custodial setting, they are protected by the 
Fifth Amendment; as such, officers are more likely to have the ability 
to effectively communicate the right to refuse.86  However, an on-the-
scene request for consent, protected by the Fourth Amendment, is 
part of the way law enforcement has to operate, and it is essential that 
an officer be able to follow an impromptu investigative lead.87  The 
police would undoubtedly be severely hampered by having to pause 
and inform the individual of his or her right to refuse.88  The Court in 
Schneckloth reasoned that this particular consideration explains why 
its prior decisions, in the consent search context, focused on the total-
ity of the circumstances and not the knowing choice requirement.89 
The Court in Schneckloth also declined to add a requirement 
that a formal waiver be required as an element of voluntary consent.90  
A formal, knowing waiver of constitutional rights is required in many 
circumstances which implicate the Fifth and Sixth Amendment’s pro-
tections over pre-trial procedure.91  Protections over rights, such as 
assistance of counsel, help “promote the fair ascertainment of truth at 
a criminal trial,” a value at the heart of our society, and without 
which, “justice will not . . . be done.”92  Therefore, the reason these 
pre-trial procedures are protected by a formal waiver requirement is 
that they are of a “wholly different order” than the reasons for ensur-
 
83 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
84 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232.  See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477) (“Our decision today 
is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating 
crime. . . .  General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime [is there-
fore] . . . not affected by our holding.”). 
85 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232 (reasoning that consent searches are undertaken in an at-
mosphere that is “immeasurably far removed from [a] custodial interrogation”). 
86 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
87 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32. 
88 Id. at 231. 
89 Id. at 234 (“Implicit in all of these cases [discussing the consent search exception] is the 
recognition that knowledge of a right to refuse is not a perquisite to a voluntary consent.”). 
90 Id. at 245. 
91 Id. at 237 (listing a variety of circumstances where a knowing and intelligent waiver is 
required before a defendant can waive his or her rights including, the right to refuse counsel, 
to confrontation, to a jury trial, and to a speedy trial, amongst others). 
92 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236, 242. 
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ing the protections of the Fourth Amendment.93  The protections of 
the Fourth Amendment, unlike the pre-trial protections, have never 
been thought of as completely and entirely necessary to maintain the 
societal interest in truth and justice.  In other words, the formal waiv-
er is not required because an individual could receive a fair and just 
resolution at trial without this protection.94  Additionally, the re-
quirement of a formal waiver would frustrate authorities, much like 
the knowing choice requirement would, because it could not be effec-
tively established in the field.95  Without the important policy justifi-
cations requiring officers to go through the complex task of determin-
ing whether the waiver had been established, there was no need to 
force officers to undertake this task.96  The Court added there was al-
so an inherent fairness in allowing an individual to consent to a 
search, even without specific knowledge or waiver of his or her 
rights.97  This fairness stems from the implicit assumption that law 
enforcement’s conduct when consent is granted may be identical to 
what occurs when officers seek a warrant.98  This assumption also 
furthers the strong societal interest in encouraging cooperation with 
the police.99  In essence, the Court in Schneckloth rejected require-
ments of knowing choice and of formal waiver because these ele-
ments are incompatible with both the policy and practicalities under-
lying the use of the Fourth Amendment.100 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITIONS OF INTOXICATION: THE 
SCHOMPERT MANIA STANDARD 
The Court in Schneckloth was able to borrow a test that not 
only protected individual rights, but also fit the investigatory needs of 
the consent search.101  This test defines voluntariness in an identical 
 
93 Id. at 242. 
94 Id. (reasoning that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are of a lesser order, 
and are not vital to the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial). 
95 Id. at 245 (“It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal, unstructured context 
of a consent search, a policeman, upon pain of tainting the evidence obtained, could make 
the detailed type of examination demanded” by the waiver requirement.).   
96 Id. at 246. 
97 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242. 
98 Id. at 243. 
99 Id 
100 Id. at 248-49. 
101 Id. at 224-25 (“Voluntariness [reflects] an accommodation of the complex of values 
implicated in police questioning of a suspect [including the] . . . need for police questioning 
11
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manner to the definition utilized in determining whether a confession 
was voluntarily given.102  Therefore, common real world circum-
stances that may affect an individual’s ability to speak freely are ana-
lyzed under the same test.103  This Section will look at a commonly 
occurring circumstance, mental impairment due to intoxication, and 
show how courts in New York have analyzed the effect of this mental 
state on the validity of a voluntary consent to search. 
The court in Perez used this test to reach its conclusion that 
intoxication did not have an effect on whether Ms. Diaz’s consent 
was voluntary.104  Although Ms. Diaz’s consent was found not to be 
given freely for other reasons, had those circumstances not existed, 
her intoxication alone would likely not have hindered her ability to 
speak voluntarily.105 
The showing required to establish that an individual does not 
meet the test of voluntariness because of intoxication is a high one; 
the individual must prove that he or she reached the point of “mania,” 
or that he or she was so intoxicated that they were “unable to com-
prehend the meaning of [their] words.”106  This standard, which was 
borrowed from the context of voluntary confessions and applied to 
the consent search context, was first articulated in New York in Peo-
ple v. Schompert.107 
In Schompert, the defendant, a chronic alcoholic with a histo-
ry of psychosis, was convicted of grand larceny and burglary.108  The 
defendant was so intoxicated that, while drinking in a bar, he chose to 
call the police himself and confess to his crimes.109  Officers testified 
that the defendant was in an advanced state of alcoholic intoxication 
and “on the verge of delirium tremens” when police spoke to him.110  
 
[and] . . . civilized notions of justice.”). 
102 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 227. 
103 See, e.g., Mary West, Intoxication, 32 Carmody-Wait 2d § 176:104 (2013) (compiling 
precedent analyzing different types of intoxication, and an individual’s ability to speak vol-
untarily). 
104 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 343. 
105 Id. at 343, 345 (“In this case, although Mr. Pabon testified that his grandmother was 
intoxicated, there is no evidence that Ms. Diaz appeared confused, disoriented or unsure 
about what was occurring when interacting with the police.”). 
106 Id. at 343 (citing People v. Shields, 742 N.Y.S.2d 909, 909 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2002); 
People v. Kehn, 486 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1985)). 
107 226 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1967). 
108 Id. at 306-07. 
109 Id. at 307. 
110 Id.  Delirium tremens is a very severe form of alcohol withdrawal, and involves sudden 
12
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The defendant had been released just days before from the hospital, 
where he was treated for alcoholism and psychosis.111  When the po-
lice arrived at the bar they did not believe the defendant’s drunken 
bragging, presumably because of his advanced intoxication and the 
peculiar circumstances.112  However, the defendant insisted on prov-
ing his guilt, and at his request, police took him to the bus station 
where he opened a locker and revealed the stolen goods.113  The ques-
tion presented to the Court of Appeals was whether his confession 
could still be considered voluntary despite his “evidently high degree 
of alcoholic intoxication.”114 
The court held that, because the principal reason for excluding 
a confession was to limit the possibility of coercion by authorities 
and not to protect wrongdoers, a confession should be deemed valid 
if the defendant is sufficiently in touch with the realities of the situa-
tion.115  The principal question that must be examined is the trustwor-
thiness and reliability of the statement, not the specific level of intox-
ication of the speaker.116  Without the speaker’s intoxication reaching 
the rare level of mania, eliminating the speaker’s ability to under-
stand the specifics of the circumstances around him, the confession 
would be deemed voluntary.117  The court held that as long as the po-
lice do not cause the defendant’s intoxication, the general presump-
tion is that the typical rules of trustworthiness and admissibility ap-
ply.118  Utilizing this test, the court held the confession was voluntary, 
despite the defendant’s extreme intoxication.119  The statement was 
also deemed highly reliable and trustworthy because the evidence 
was recovered shortly after the confession.120 
The requirement of “mania,” the inability to comprehend real-
ity, as set out in Schompert, appears to be an exceedingly difficult 
one to prove; courts have held confessions to be voluntary in a num-
 
and severe mental or nervous system changes, including but not limited to confusion, agita-
tion, hallucinations, and seizures.  David C. Dugdale, Delirium Tremens, PUBMED HEALTH, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001771/ (last visited May 9, 2013). 
111 Schompert, 266 N.E.2d at 307. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 306-07. 
115 Id. at 307-08. 
116 Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 309. 
117 Id. at 308. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 307. 
120 Id. 
13
Goldstein: Searches and Seizures
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1230 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
ber of outrageous circumstances, particularly circumstances where a 
high degree of individual impairment is evident to most people based 
on common sense and experience.121  In People v. Roth,122 the de-
fendant sold drugs to an undercover informant after admitting that he 
had been “freebasing”123 crack-cocaine for over twenty hours.124  In 
People v. Perry,125 the defendant made his confession while under the 
influence of numerous mind-altering drugs, including cocaine and al-
cohol.126  In People v. Kehn,127 the defendant was so intoxicated that 
he remembered absolutely nothing, including confessing to or com-
mitting the crime.128  The defendant’s blackout in Kehn lasted from 
the time he was a passenger in a car, the evening before the crime, 
until the next morning when he awoke in a jail cell.129  In People v. 
Adams,130 the defendant, who suffered from a serious mental illness, 
ingested the same sleeping pills she gave her husband before attack-
ing him.131  These pills were so strong, and affected the victim so 
strongly, that he was bludgeoned to death without even stirring.132  
However, none of these defendants’ confessions were held to be 
made involuntarily because of their impairment.133  All of these de-
fendants were deemed to be sufficiently in touch with the realities of 
their individual situations to confess voluntarily.134  While the court 
in Schompert specifically held that it was theoretically possible for a 
defendant’s confession to be made involuntarily because of their in-
 
121 See David J. Hanson, How Alcohol Affects Us: The Biphasic Curve, ALCOHOL: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, http://www2.potsdam.edu/hansondj/HealthIssues/1100827422.html 
(last visited May 9, 2013) (demonstrating how in many individuals, a minimum of two 
drinks can bring an individual to a level of intoxication that would affect their ability to 
drive, and cause euphoria). 
122 527 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1988). 
123 “Freebasing” is the act of preparing to use cocaine in a very specific, and dangerous 
manner, involving taking purified solid cocaine, mixing it an alkaloid base, and then heating 
it over a metallic surface. 
124 Roth, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 99. 
125 535 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1988). 
126 Id. at 34. 
127 486 N.Y.S.2d 380 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1985). 
128 Id. at 382. 
129 Id. 
130 257 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1970). 
131 Id. at 610-11. 
132 Id. 
133 Roth, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 100; Perry, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Kehn, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 382; 
Adams, 257 N.E.2d at 613. 
134 Id. 
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toxication,135 it seems difficult to imagine a scenario that would meet 
this criterion.136 
V. THE SCOPE OF INTOXICATED CONSENT: LESSONS TAKEN 
FROM COMBINING SCHNECKLOTH AND SCHOMPERT 
The Schompert mania standard relies on the basic definition 
of voluntariness set out in Schneckloth,137 and has been used to de-
termine whether consent to search has been voluntarily given despite 
an individual’s intoxication.138  As such, it would seem to be equally 
difficult to establish that an individual was too intoxicated to give a 
valid consent to search.139  However, Schneckloth’s second holding, 
that the knowing choice and waiver requirements are not applicable 
in assessing the voluntariness of a search, is more useful to a discus-
sion of the effect of intoxication on the validity of consent.140  Ex-
cluding these requirements is important because the limitations pre-
sented by the knowing choice and waiver requirements helped 
fashion the only limit presented by the court in Schompert.  Specifi-
cally, in Schompert the court held that it was possible for a confes-
sion to be made involuntarily because of alcoholic mania.141  The 
court reasoned that this would be possible for example if someone 
was unconscious but still somehow confessing.142  This hypothetical 
was based on the fact that while unconscious there would be no pos-
 
135 Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 308. 
136 For example in Roth, the defendant admitted to ingesting cocaine by freebasing or 
smoking it for a period of twenty-five hours.  Roth, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 99.  According to the 
National Drug Administration, ingesting cocaine in this manner, for that extended period of 
time could cause hallucinations, or even full-blown paranoid psychosis, and death.   Drug 
Facts: Cocaine, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/ 
drugfacts/cocaine (last visited May 9, 2013).  If a scenario such as the one in Roth did not 
invalidate the voluntariness of the statement, the question is begged whether any human be-
ing could be intoxicated enough to invalidate his or her statement without dying because of 
their intoxication. 
137 Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 307. 
138 See, e.g., Shields, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2002) (using the 
Schompert mania standard to determine whether a defendant’s intoxication invalidated his 
voluntary grant of consent to search). 
139 See Roth, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 100; Perry, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Kehn, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 382; 
Adams, 257 N.E.2d at 613. 
140 See supra Part III (discussing how the Court in Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218, refused to 
apply the protective requirements of a knowing choice, and intelligent waiver to the context 
of Fourth Amendment consent searches). 
141 Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 305. 
142 Id. 
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sibility of informing the individual of the consequences of his 
choice.143 
However, as the Court held in Schneckloth, the policy inter-
ests behind the Fourth Amendment are of a lesser order, merely 
providing security against arbitrary intrusions by police.144  It follows 
then that an individual’s grant of consent while intoxicated would 
have essentially only one major limitation, which is that the statement 
never be coerced.145  In fact, in People v. Kates,146 the Court of Ap-
peals reached the result suggested as inappropriate by the hypothet-
ical in Schompert147 when it permitted a search of a defendant’s body 
while he was unconscious, pursuant to a previously existing valid 
grant of consent.148  In Kates, the defendant was arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol and causing a fatal car wreck.149  After 
interviewing witnesses, officers went to examine the defendant in the 
emergency room of a nearby hospital.150  When officers arrived at the 
hospital, the defendant was essentially unconscious; he was too intox-
icated and disoriented to object or refuse the officers’ requests to per-
form a blood test.151  Relying on the implied consent law discussed in 
the next Section, the court in Kates found that the defendant had giv-
en consent in advance of the crash for a search of his blood for the 
presence of alcohol, and that officers had acted constitutionally when 
relying on that consent and taking a blood sample.152 
 
143 Id. at 308. 
144 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242. 
145 Id. at 247 (“There is no reason to believe . . . that the response to a policeman’s [re-
quest for consent] is presumptively coerced.”). 
146 428 N.E.2d 852 (N.Y. 1981). 
147 Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 308 (refusing a per se rule that intoxication has no effect on 
voluntariness, because of the possibility that an individual could be so intoxicated he or she 
would not be sufficiently in touch with their faculties to voluntarily confess).  Although the 
grant of consent in Kates occurred before the defendant became intoxicated, his consent ex-
tended beyond the time he drank himself into unconsciousness.  Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 447-
48. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 447. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448 (holding that the blood test was constitutional under the stat-
utorily granted consent and pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement).  See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that exigent cir-
cumstances, and the ready destructibility of evidence permits officers to take a blood test 
from an arrestee if they suspect him or her of driving under the influence of alcohol, because 
the evidence consists of alcohol in the bloodstream, which rapidly deteriorates after he or she 
stops drinking). 
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VI. NEW YORK DUI PROCEDURE: IMPLIED CONSENT AND THE 
RIGHT TO REFUSE 
New York State has expanded the distinction between pro-
tected confessions and searches with its implied consent law.153  
Since 1953, drivers in New York have impliedly consented to a 
search of their bodies for the presence of alcohol, simply by operating 
a motor vehicle.154  Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law (“VTL”) 
section 1194, drivers are deemed to have given consent for a search 
of their “breath, blood, urine, or saliva, for the purpose of determin-
ing” the alcohol or drug content of the sample.155  This sample can 
only be seized if the officer has probable cause to believe an individ-
ual committed the offense of driving while intoxicated and the sam-
ple is requested within two hours after the arrest.156 
However, the New York driver does have a right to revoke 
this consent.157  In 1953, the legislature added the right to refuse to 
“avoid the unpleasantness” associated with “administering a chemical 
test on an unwilling subject.”158  But the right to refuse is in no way 
constitutionally necessary.159  In fact, the United States Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals have determined that the right to re-
fuse is merely a grace provided by the legislature.160  The right to re-
fuse in New York functions as follows: a report of the individual’s 
refusal is issued, and their driver’s license is temporarily suspended 
pending a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to 
believe the defendant was intoxicated and whether the defendant was 
adequately warned of the consequences of his or her refusal.161  If the 
prosecution prevails at the hearing, the defendant’s license is sus-
pended for twelve to eighteen months, and he or she is also required 
to pay civil penalties of at least five-hundred dollars.162  However, in 
 
153 Implied consent means that an individual consents to a search by engaging in a specific 
activity, for example a search of his or her body by choosing to operate a motor vehicle.  
VTL § 1194(2).  
154 People v. Daniel, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1981) (“Present section 
1194 has its origin in chapter 854 of the laws of 1953.”). 
155 VTL § 1194(2)(a)(1)-(4).  
156 Id. at § 1194(2)(a)(1). 
157 Id. at § 1194(2). 
158 People v. Haitz, 411 N.Y.S.2d 57, 60 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1978). 
159 Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757). 
160 South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 (1983); Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448. 
161 VTL § 1194(2)(b)-(c). 
162 Id. at § 1194 (1)(c)-(2). 
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some circumstances the right to refuse can be overridden by police 
pursuant to a court order.163  This occurs when the police or district 
attorney’s office requests and obtains a court order compelling the 
individual to undergo the test.164  In the current state of the law, how-
ever, the prosecuting authority can only seek such an order if the 
driver killed or caused serious physical injury to someone other than 
themselves.165 
In December of 2010, Ray LaHood, the United States Secre-
tary of Transportation, called for all states to weaken or eliminate a 
driver’s right to refuse.166  Senator Fuschillo of the New York State 
Legislature attempted to introduce this policy into New York law, 
and sought to eliminate the right to refuse contained in VTL section 
1194.167  The bill presented the justification that because of the right 
to refuse, prosecutors are often forced to proceed to trial without the 
sole piece of objective evidence that would prove their case, and 
therefore, many defendants opt for the civil penalties and license rev-
ocation.168 
The change in refusal procedure presented by Fuschillo’s bill 
is an important one.  If an arrestee refuses the search, an officer 
would be required to request a court order compelling the defendant 
to submit to the test.169  The officer would have to certify under oath 
that there is probable cause to believe the individual committed the 
offense of driving while intoxicated.170  The court order could be 
sought in any case where there is probable cause to suspect the de-
fendant committed the offense, and not just in cases where injury or 
death has occurred.171  The committee report asserts that this “would 
add real teeth to the implied consent provision.”172  Additionally, as 
will be discussed in the next Section, the standards utilized in Perez 
 
163 Id. at § 1194 (3). 
164 Id. at § 1194 (3)(d). 
165 Id. at § 1194 (3)(b)(1) (“Court ordered chemical tests . . . [are] authorized . . . [upon a 
finding that the driver] . . . was the operator of a motor vehicle and in the course of such op-
eration a person other than the operator was killed or suffered serious physical injury . . . .”). 
166 U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood Announces Holiday Drunk Driving Crack-
down, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/PR/DOT-209-10. 
167 S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011). 
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have already developed a model that balances individual liberties 
with the bite that the new legislation seeks to add to New York im-
plied consent law. 
VII. THE EXPANSION OF IMPLIED CONSENT: A BETTER MODEL 
FOR ELIMINATING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE 
As the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals 
have held, eliminating the right to refuse would be constitutionally 
permissible, as a defendant may be required to provide non-
testimonial bodily evidence, such as blood, breath, urine, or saliva, 
lawfully under the Fourth Amendment, if there is probable cause to 
suspect him or her of driving under the influence.173  For whatever 
reason, presumably the distasteful image of officers physically forc-
ing drunken individuals to comply with blood tests, the right to refuse 
remains alive and well in New York.174 
This may be in part because the current model for assessment 
of this practice focuses on its constitutionality either as a function of 
the warrant requirement,175 or as a means of seizing readily destructi-
ble evidence which is a valid exception to the warrant requirement.176  
While these two methods of analyzing the permissibility of the prac-
tice reach the same result as an analysis under the doctrine of consent 
searches, their focus is entirely different.177  Seizures of evidence 
conducted pursuant to a warrant, or the readily destructible evidence 
exception focus on constraining police procedures in order to main-
tain the traditional balance of reasonableness.178 
 
173 Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 (1983); Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448. 
174 Haitz, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (asserting that the purpose of the right to refuse is to avoid 
the unnecessary unpleasantness of forcing the unwilling individual to undergo the test). 
175 See VTL § 1194(3)(b) (requiring officers to get a court order, founded on probable 
cause to believe the driver committed the offense of DUI, essentially a warrant, to force a 
defendant to undergo a compulsory chemical test). 
176 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (permitting the seizure of a defendant’s blood without 
a warrant because the evidence in his blood stream was readily destructible); see also Skin-
ner v. Nat’l Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (extending Schmerber’s pro-
tections over a search to an individual’s urine and breath samples obtained for the purpose of 
determining his or her level of intoxication). 
177 See Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448 (holding that the search of defendant’s blood for the 
presence of alcohol was permissible as either a grant of consent, pursuant to the implied con-
sent statute, or as a search conducted validly under Schmerber). 
178 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 679 (2005) (Lynch, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
purpose of probable cause and the warrant requirement is to force the government to justify 
its choice of a particular investigative technique despite its intrusion into an individual’s lib-
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The consent search rationale, however, focuses on assessing 
the permissibility of a particular search or seizure of evidence 
through an entirely different lens.  The consent search is in part about 
the individual coming forward to participate in the greater goal of 
ridding society of wrongdoing.179  Assessing the constitutionality of 
destroying the right to refuse from this perspective presents an entire-
ly different, and more palatable, focus.180  With the implied consent 
model, the discussion is no longer about restraining police conduct, 
but rather focuses on considerations that affect an individual’s mind-
set.  This mindset centers around the legal fiction that all individuals 
agree to grant the implied consent when accepting their license as 
part of the societal goal of maintaining safer roads.181  The goal of 
protecting drivers is furthered by expanding the scope of implied 
consent searches.  Under the principle of general deterrence, it is like-
ly that if the right to refuse was removed from New York law, many 
more individuals would choose to partake in society’s goal of main-
taining safe and sober roadways.182  This presents a much more ap-
pealing image, in that instead of police choosing to invade on indi-
vidual drivers’ lives, the focus is now on all citizens choosing to 
 
erty interests). 
179 “It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information 
they have to aid in law enforcement.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78.  Additionally, citizens 
have a strong interest in encouraging consent searches to help ensure the accurate determina-
tion of criminal trials, and should never be discouraged from pursuing this interest.  
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 488). 
180 Compare Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225 (assessing whether the consenter had a subjec-
tive state of voluntariness), with Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (assessing whether an officer 
was justified in invading an individual’s bodily integrity in light of his suspicions about the 
individual’s suspected involvement in a crime). 
181 See NY Bill Jacket, 2010 S.B. 46, ch. 169 (asserting that the purpose of implied con-
sent and driving under the influence law is to protect individual safety when using the road). 
182 S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (suggesting that eliminating the right 
to refuse would strengthen the implied consent provision in VTL § 1194).  Compare MADD-
Maine, supra note 25 (twenty-three DUI fatalities), with MADD–New York, MADD, 
http://www.MADD.org/drunk-driving/state-stats/New_York.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) 
(315 DUI fatalities). 
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allow this procedure to help maintain society’s safety.183 
It could be argued that the drunk driver does not choose to 
submit to the societal goal of maintaining safe roadways, as evi-
denced by his or her dangerous choice to get behind the wheel.184  
However, a focus on implied consent, rather than traditional intrusion 
paradigms, again provides a more tolerable image when analyzing the 
role of a driver in the general scheme.185  If the right to refuse is elim-
inated, the driver will have made a statement, reflecting a choice, 
which affects his constitutional rights, the grant of consent given at 
the time he or she received a license.186  Under Schneckloth, that con-
sent, once validly given without coercion, supports the constitutional-
ity of the search in reliance on an individual’s choice to participate in 
protecting society’s interests.187  In this situation, the search is specif-
ically part of society’s interest in helping law enforcement’s on-the-
scene investigation into whether the specific crime of driving under 
the influence has occurred,188 and shifts the focus towards the driver’s 
choices.189 
However, Schompert is what adds the key piece to the equa-
tion.  Under the Schompert mania standard, intoxication has little to 
no effect on the voluntariness of the statement, and the individual is 
held to the consequences of his or her choice.190  When Schneckloth 
and Schompert are combined, they stand for the proposition that an 
 
183 Compare Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 488 (distinguishing the interest in maintaining a safe 
society by encouraging citizens to come forward with evidence that may aid law enforce-
ment), with Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1951) (using a “shock the conscience” 
test to determine whether a police action violates due process because of the inappropriate 
manner in which it was conducted), and Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446 (discussing the effect of 
police brutality on efforts to secure testimony from witnesses as part of its holding that vol-
untariness is a key factor to assessing whether a confession can be used against an individual 
constitutionally).  “It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever in-
formation they have to aid in law enforcement.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78. 
184 See Drunk Driving Facts, supra note 23 (highlighting that 360,000 people are killed or 
injured by drunk drivers). 
185 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225 (highlighting a variety of the individual interests fur-
thered and protected by an individual’s ability to consent to a search, such as the community 
interest in pursuing justice for all). 
186 See VTL § 1194(2)(a) (“Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be 
deemed to have given consent to a chemical test.”). 
187 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49. 
188 See VTL§ 1194(2)(a)(1) (requiring an in the field officer to assess whether there is 
probable cause to believe the individual committed the offense of driving under the influence 
before using the individual’s implied consent to require them to undergo testing). 
189 See supra note 181. 
190 Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 308. 
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individual, even an intoxicated individual, is held to the consequenc-
es of his or her voluntary statement.191  Therefore, it follows that in-
toxication should have no bearing on the scope of consent that has al-
ready been validly given in advance.192  Nor should an individual’s 
subjective impairment be permitted to bear any weight on an attempt 
to revoke that valid consent.193  When individuals give implied con-
sent to search they further an important societal goal, and they have 
subjective knowledge of their choice to help further that goal.  There-
fore, individuals cannot be allowed to attempt to revoke consent and 
avoid promoting those goals because of drunken lapses in judgment. 
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF PEREZ 
The court in Perez continued to extend two important facets 
of the voluntary consent search, first, the application of Fifth 
Amendment voluntary confession standards to the test of voluntari-
ness of a grant of consent to search.194  Second, the court in Perez 
continued to apply these standards correctly to the specific test of 
whether intoxication has any bearing on the validity of consent.195  As 
is shown by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Schneckloth, the dangers 
presented by a voluntary consent search are minimal, and distin-
guished from many other important constitutional protections.196  
This leaves room for the test of voluntary consent used in Perez to be 
applied to an individual’s choice to obtain a driver’s license, and 
submit to a test of their body for the presence of alcohol.197  When 
 
191 See supra Parts III-V (discussing the effect of intoxication on an individual’s subjec-
tive voluntariness and consent to search). 
192 See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252 (using an objective reasonableness test to determine 
whether an officer’s communication with a consenter presented a limit on the scope of his or 
her consent).  It is likely that despite an attempt to refuse, a driver’s consent under N.Y. VEH. 
& TRAF. LAW § 1194 would not be exceeded by the scope of a search of his or her body for 
alcohol if the statutory language is updated to expressly expand consent, and eliminate the 
right to refuse, as was suggested by S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011). 
193 Subjective impairment has no effect on the validity of implied consent.  Kates, 428 
N.E.2d at 448.  Subjective impairment also has no effect on the validity of traditional grants 
of consent.  See Shields, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (holding that unless an individual is so intoxi-
cated they cannot remain in touch with the world, his or her consent is valid).  See also supra 
Part IV. 
194 Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 343. 
195 Id. 
196 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27. 
197 The consent is granted at the time the individual chooses to operate a vehicle under the 
influence.  See VTL § 1194(2)(a).  
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this test is applied correctly, it supports new legislation eliminating 
the right to refuse both legally,198 and practically, by providing a par-
adigm focusing on individual responsibility and choice.199  Undoubt-
edly, it is the act of a responsible citizen to come forward and aid the 
police if possible,200 and the deterrent effect of eliminating the right 
to refuse bolsters the impression that this is simply the right thing to 
do.201  There is arguably no more responsible act for citizens of New 
York than to come forward and help combat one of the greatest dan-
gers in our society today.202 
 
Avi Goldstein
*
 
 
 
198 See S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (eliminating the right to refuse 
from New York law).  The right to refuse is nothing more than a statutory grace provided to 
citizens.  Neville, 459 U.S. at 565. 
199 See supra note 181. 
200 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243. 
201 “Whoever saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire world.”  Babylonian 
Talmud:  Sanhedrin, Folio 37a.  See also supra note 182 (highlighting that lives are saved by 
strengthening the right to refuse in limited circumstances).  A combination of these princi-
ples justifies cracking down on drunk driving by adding strength to our implied consent 
laws. 
202 New York State drunk drivers cause 27% of the total traffic related deaths in the state 
and cost the taxpayers over two billion dollars a year.  See MADD–New York, supra note 
182. 
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